With just over a week remaining before the scheduled summit between Chinese President Xi Jinping and former U.S. President Donald Trump in Washington, officials are cautiously managing expectations about the outcome. Despite recent tensions—most notably over Taiwan, which prompted Xi to threaten canceling the meeting—the primary significance of the summit lies in its occurrence rather than any substantive agreements.
The relationship between Xi and Trump has long been characterized by a transactional dynamic lacking firm principles. Agreements between the two leaders have often been tenuous and susceptible to reneging. Their interactions are largely defined by a precarious balance of strategic deterrence, preventing escalations that could provoke mutual harm. Recent shifts in Trump’s tone toward China and Xi have moved from hostile rhetoric to a more admiring posture, yet the underlying mistrust remains a significant barrier to progress.
The last major in-person meeting between the two was in Beijing in May, though a pivotal encounter took place in South Korea last October. During that meeting, Trump delayed the imposition of additional tariffs in exchange for Xi’s tentative easing of export controls on rare earth minerals—a critical resource for various high-tech industries, for which China holds near-monopoly status. While Xi reportedly agreed to a moratorium on export controls lasting until November, Chinese exports of rare earths to the United States have declined in recent months amid apprehensions among producers about Beijing’s stance. In a further move, China added two U.S. rare earth companies to its export control list in June, complicating Washington’s efforts to diversify its supply chains.
This tactic underscores Beijing’s willingness to leverage economic measures as a demonstration of strength. Previous U.S.-China agreements, such as the so-called “phase 1” deal from Trump’s initial presidential term, included commitments from China to liberalize certain sectors and increase purchases of American goods, notably soybeans. However, these obligations were rarely fulfilled. A subsequent soybean purchase agreement in 2025 has reportedly met its targets so far, but adherence remains voluntary and contingent on changing political priorities.
On the U.S. side, Trump’s unpredictable approach to trade — including abrupt tariff increases — has undermined the durability of prior accords. His decisions to maintain or escalate tariffs appear driven less by principled trade policy than by strategic calculations aimed at deterring Chinese retaliation.
The broader U.S.-China competition is largely unfolding in economic and technological spheres, with both countries striving to build resilient supply chains and advance critical technologies to reduce vulnerabilities. China’s actions involving rare earth exports serve as a reminder of the U.S.’s limited domestic capacity in this sector. Concurrently, Beijing is intensifying efforts to catch up in semiconductor technology but remains behind the U.S. and its allies.
Artificial intelligence governance, a topic on the summit’s agenda, is unlikely to yield significant agreements beyond establishing a bilateral dialogue. Trump has shown no inclination toward international constraints on AI, focusing instead on preserving U.S. leadership in the field.
Historically, successful summits involving U.S. presidents—such as Nixon’s 1972 visit to China, Reagan and Gorbachev’s 1986 Reykjavik meeting, and Clinton and Yeltsin’s 1990s engagements—resulted from mutual trust and a shared interest in durable cooperation. In contrast, the current Xi-Trump relationship is marked by instability and limited goodwill.
While the summit may not produce substantial breakthroughs, its mere occurrence helps reduce the risk of abrupt escalations in tensions or trade conflicts. At this stage, maintaining dialogue appears to be the summit’s most tangible achievement.