Efforts by the Trump administration to initiate trilateral nuclear arms control discussions with Russia and China are encountering significant challenges, especially due to reluctance from both countries. The upcoming summit in Shenzhen may mark the first leader-level dialogue among the three powers, but expectations for substantive agreements remain low.
China has consistently opposed joining nuclear arms reduction talks that include the United States and Russia, citing the much larger size of their arsenals. According to estimates by the Federation of American Scientists, China’s nuclear stockpile of about 600 warheads is significantly smaller than the roughly 4,000 warheads each held by the United States and Russia, which together account for nearly 86 percent of global nuclear weapons. Despite this disparity, China’s arsenal has roughly doubled over the past decade, and the Pentagon projects it could reach approximately 1,500 warheads by 2035.
A Chinese official involved in sensitive diplomatic efforts stated that China’s stance on nuclear negotiations remains firm, with discussions on limiting or monitoring its nuclear forces declared off the table. Analysts attribute this resistance to China’s desire for the U.S. and Russia to first undertake deeper cuts before considering Beijing’s participation. Tong Zhao, a China nuclear expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, described Beijing’s position as lacking political will for trilateral nuclear control talks and focused on ensuring the other two powers bear the primary responsibility for reductions.
China’s expanding capabilities include new missile technologies and a growing nuclear triad, highlighted by a record submarine-launched ballistic missile test in July. U.S. officials have also accused China of conducting a clandestine nuclear explosion in 2020, a charge Beijing denies, viewing it as an attempt by Washington to pressure China into negotiations.
Russia’s stance adds another layer of complexity. While Moscow engages the U.S. in bilateral talks regarding the war in Ukraine and broader European security arrangements, including NATO nuclear deterrence and the deployment of nuclear arms to Belarus, it appears less interested in trilateral nuclear discussions. Observers suggest that Russia, which benefits economically from China’s support amid the Ukraine conflict, does not prioritize nuclear arms talks in this multilateral format and prefers bilateral negotiations with the United States.
Former U.S. negotiator Rose Gottemoeller noted that a realistic outcome from the looming summit would be a formal statement to continue exploring nuclear controls, rather than concrete agreements. The history of U.S.-Russia arms control negotiations spans decades, but integrating China—whose capabilities and strategic posture differ markedly—complicates the process, a challenge experts have likened to a "three-body problem."
While Chinese officials have proposed modest confidence-building measures, such as reciprocal visits to nuclear sites similar to past U.S.-Russia agreements, broader cooperation remains tenuous. One potential avenue for dialogue is around artificial intelligence’s role in nuclear command and control, following a joint Biden-Xi statement endorsing human oversight over nuclear weapon use.
U.S. officials emphasize that current global realities require multilateral arms control efforts, arguing bilateral treaties now fail to address multiple nuclear threats. However, the interplay of geopolitical tensions and differing national strategies makes progress in trilateral arms control an uphill task at best, leaving nuclear dialogue vulnerable to being overshadowed by broader diplomatic disputes and security concerns.
