The European Union is seeking to deepen its engagement with Syria following the collapse of the Bashar Assad regime, with Turkiye identified as a pivotal partner in this evolving dynamic. This week, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaija Kallas, visited Damascus, expressing Brussels' interest in upgrading its partnership with Syria and contributing to the country’s recovery, while emphasizing the need for further domestic reforms.

The recent developments mark a significant shift in EU-Syria relations. After years of estrangement, the EU gradually began easing economic sanctions on Syria, culminating in May with the first high-level political dialogue held in Brussels. Earlier this month, EU Ambassador Michael Ohnmacht formally presented his credentials to Syrian President Ahmad Al-Sharaa, marking the EU's return at the ambassadorial level to Syria for the first time since 2012. Syrian Foreign Minister Assiad Al-Shabani announced plans to replace the longstanding 1977 cooperation accord with a modern partnership agreement, reflecting a desire to normalize and expand ties.

Turkiye’s role in the Syria crisis has long been important to both the EU and the region. As an EU candidate country hosting the largest population of Syrian refugees, and sharing a border with Syria, Turkiye has worked closely with the EU on issues such as counterterrorism and migration management. The 2016 EU-Turkiye migration agreement, aimed at curbing irregular migration across the Aegean Sea, cemented this cooperation with commitments on managing refugee flows and humanitarian support inside Syria near the Turkish border.

The EU has consistently viewed Turkiye as an essential partner on its southeastern frontier, with analysts describing Ankara as “Europe’s gatekeeper” in the Syrian context. Despite fluctuations in relations, Syria remained a convergence point for Turkish and European interests, encompassing migration, security, and foreign policy.

The prolongation of the Syrian conflict prompted European countries to reassess their stance toward the Assad regime. Some, like Italy, restored diplomatic ties in 2024, signaling a pragmatic acceptance of Assad’s secular government as preferable to instability or extremist alternatives. Italy’s move was seen as an effort to nudge other EU members to adopt a similar approach.

However, the recent fall of Assad’s regime has led to renewed recalibration. Several Western delegations have since visited Damascus to foster ties with Syria’s new leadership and support its reintegration into the international system. Turkiye, which maintained complex but close relations with the post-Assad authorities and provided various forms of support, remains a key actor in this process. Ankara’s geographical proximity, its history of supporting opposition groups, and its significant role hosting refugees grant it notable influence in Syria’s transition.

The EU acknowledges Turkiye’s substantial leverage in post-Assad Syria, recognizing that its own influence is comparatively limited. Many officials see overlapping interests between the EU and Turkiye in shaping Syria’s future, particularly in enhancing Syria’s role as a security partner for Europe. Additionally, Turkey is poised to facilitate connectivity projects that could link Syria more closely with the European continent, underscoring its potential as a crucial conduit in the region’s reintegration and stabilization efforts.