The Trump administration has intensified pressure on Cuba, seeking to replicate its January military removal of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro. However, experts suggest that overthrowing the Cuban regime is less likely, despite Venezuela’s close historical support for Havana.
In Venezuela, the United States detained Maduro in a swift raid on January 3, leading then-Vice President Delcy Rodríguez to assume the acting presidency. Cuba’s leadership structure offers no comparable figure to step in if President Miguel Díaz-Canel or former President Raúl Castro were displaced. Cuba’s security forces have methodically dismantled alternative sources of power, according to Orlando Pérez, a scholar specializing in US-Latin American relations at the University of North Texas.
Unlike Venezuela, which has a recognized opposition leader in Nobel laureate María Corina Machado—who won elections in 2024 but was blocked from power—Cuba lacks a similarly prominent internal challenger. Although Raúl Rodríguez Castro, the grandson of Raúl Castro, recently met with CIA Director John Ratcliffe during a rare visit to Havana, he holds no formal government position and has publicly opposed US efforts, including attending a rally protesting his grandfather’s recent indictment by the United States.
The US-Cuba antagonism dates back to the 1959 Cuban revolution led by Fidel Castro. President Trump has garnered strong support from hardline Cuban-American communities in Florida, who have long advocated for US-driven regime change. U.S. policymakers view Cuba as a former Soviet satellite close to the US mainland, with recent concerns tied to Chinese influence in the region. However, since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russian involvement in Cuba has diminished, and the island’s economic challenges have weakened its ability to confront Washington directly.
Instability in Cuba raises concerns about a potential migration crisis, as widespread power outages and economic strain affect the population. Cuba's military is considered more ideologically committed and cohesive than Venezuela’s, and the country has enhanced its intelligence and surveillance capacities through years of collaboration with Russia and China. Cuban agents suffered casualties during their deployment in Venezuela in January, providing lessons about US operations, which may influence Cuba’s defensive posture.
Unlike resource-rich Venezuela, which has attracted US oil companies amid an export surge, Cuba lacks comparable natural resources. The island’s tourism sector, operated by state entities dominated by the military conglomerate Gaesa, lags behind other Caribbean destinations and has been further weakened by US sanctions, including a blockade and trade deterrents aimed at Cuba’s suppliers.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, a prominent Cuba hawk and a son of Cuban immigrants, is widely seen as the architect of the administration’s hardline Cuba policy. A political figure with presidential ambitions, Rubio may seek to leverage any significant regime change in Cuba; however, failure could pose risks amid pressing US budget deficits and costly military engagements elsewhere, including in Iran.
Legal constraints also limit Washington’s capacity to alter Cuba’s trajectory. The 1996 Helms-Burton Act prohibits lifting the longstanding US embargo absent specific democratic reforms in Cuba, making unilateral moves like those taken in Venezuela unfeasible. Cuba’s state-dominated economy, with Gaesa controlling key sectors such as hotels, ports, banks, and retail, complicates US efforts further. Additionally, while Venezuela’s government faced US accusations of "narcoterrorism," Cuba has not been charged similarly and asserts ongoing cooperation with the United States against drug trafficking.
Overall, the complex political, economic, and institutional factors differentiate Cuba’s situation from Venezuela’s, indicating that US pressure alone may be insufficient to dislodge the Cuban government.
