A prominent American defense analyst has called for a significant overhaul of U.S. military commitments in Asia, including withdrawing most forces stationed in the region and ending mutual defense treaties with key allies such as Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia. Jennifer Kavanagh, a senior fellow at Defense Priorities and member of the Council on Foreign Relations, outlined her proposals in a paper released on September 10, sparking debate among U.S. security experts ahead of the anticipated September 24 summit between President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping.
Kavanagh argues that U.S. defense obligations in Asia are overstretched and risk entangling the country in conflicts that may not be in its strategic interest. She advocates for a shift away from the current military posture focused on the “first island chain,” which includes Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Borneo—regions close to the Chinese coast and considered vulnerable—and instead concentrate on the “second island chain” farther into the Pacific, spanning from Japan to Guam, Palau, and parts of Micronesia. According to her, such a realignment would preserve U.S. access to important economic markets and trade routes while making defense positions more sustainable.
A central component of Kavanagh’s proposal is to abandon the longstanding U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity regarding Taiwan. She suggests that Washington should explicitly state it would not intervene militarily if China were to attack the self-governing island, citing the rising costs and risks associated with such a conflict in light of China’s growing military capabilities. While acknowledging that a Chinese takeover of Taiwan could disrupt the global semiconductor supply—and adversely affect the U.S.—she emphasizes the need for domestic efforts to reshore critical industries.
On the issue of U.S. alliance commitments, Kavanagh contends that the mutual defense treaty with the Philippines should be terminated due to the unreliability of the country's military to defend contested areas in the South China Sea, which could draw the U.S. into a potentially unwinnable dispute with China. For Japan and South Korea, she advocates a reduced American military presence, arguing these wealthy nations can assume greater responsibility for their defense without formal defense treaties.
The proposals have drawn mixed reactions. Some officials note overlaps with Pentagon policy makers who support prioritizing resources but differ on strategy. Elbridge Colby, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, favors strengthening U.S. military presence along the first island chain to contain China, a stance reflected in current National Security and Defense Strategies. Zack Cooper, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, expressed skepticism, warning that moving forces to the second island chain could reduce U.S. operational flexibility and increase vulnerability to long-range strikes, while diminishing alliances could prompt regional partners to align more closely with China or pursue their own nuclear arms programs—both outcomes detrimental to U.S. interests.
Former U.S. diplomat David Meade observes that Kavanagh’s think tank reflects a growing segment within Washington that supports restraint and recalibration in U.S. Asia policy, coinciding with changing U.S. strategic priorities. Some analysts argue that the Trump administration is already signaling a retreat from its “pivot to Asia” policy seen under previous administrations. The renaming of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command to U.S. Pacific Command and the sidelining of multilateral groups like the Quad suggest a narrowing of focus primarily toward economic competition with China, rather than maintaining a broad security network in the region.
The planned expansion of AUKUS—a trilateral security pact between the U.S., Australia, and the UK—aims to enhance naval capabilities with the deployment of nuclear-powered submarines to Australia. However, this initiative faces industrial and financial challenges. Analysts note these shifts have occurred with limited public debate, raising questions about the future of American grand strategy in Asia and whether maintaining dominance in the Indo-Pacific remains a priority amid China’s rise.