In recent years, Britain has faced a growing challenge from Iranian-backed networks operating within its borders, involved in assassination plots, surveillance of dissidents, and attacks on Jewish targets. Security officials and experts warn that Iran is engaging in a form of hybrid warfare on UK soil, employing proxy groups and criminal networks rather than directly deploying operatives from the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) or the Ministry of Intelligence and Security.

This modus operandi echoes the approach Russia adopted following the 2018 Salisbury poisoning of former Russian spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter with the nerve agent novichok. After the Salisbury attack, the UK rapidly expelled Russian diplomats, coordinated with allied countries to impose diplomatic sanctions, and cracked down on Russian financial channels. The response was seen as a strong assertion of British sovereignty. However, critics argue that when it comes to Iran’s activities, the UK response has been slower and less cohesive.

MI5 and counterterrorism units have identified over 20 potentially deadly plots linked to Iranian-backed groups in the UK, with targets including Iranian dissidents and the Jewish community. These actions culminated in the passage of the National Security (State Threats) Act under former Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer’s government. The legislation imposes penalties for supporting or facilitating the activities of the IRGC and its proxies, including cyber operatives and radicalization networks within community institutions. It stops short of proscribing the IRGC outright, partly because such a ban could complicate diplomatic efforts, including negotiations for the release of dual nationals imprisoned in Iran.

British officials have grappled with the legal and strategic difficulties of countering a hostile foreign power using terrorism-like methods while maintaining diplomatic channels. Starmer’s advisers argued that an outright ban on the IRGC risked undermining dialogues relevant to regional security, such as those concerning the Strait of Hormuz, amid the ongoing tensions involving the United States and Iran. Meanwhile, the European Union has taken a firmer stance by fully proscribing the IRGC.

Security analysts emphasize that legislative measures are ineffective without rigorous, intelligence-led implementation. Simone Rodan-Benzaquen of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies advocates for comprehensive mapping of IRGC-affiliated networks, disruption of their sanctions-evasion mechanisms, stricter visa and residency controls for regime facilitators, and closer scrutiny of Iranian diplomatic activities in the UK. She stresses that success should be measured by the reduction in Iranian operatives, front organizations, financial channels, and the capacity to intimidate on British territory over the coming years.

This evolving threat landscape demands a shift in Britain’s security posture. As Iran increasingly contracts local criminal groups to carry out covert operations, British security forces must develop internal defenses against these discreet and decentralized disruptors. The situation reflects a broader trend seen with Russia, which has similarly adapted to international pressure by outsourcing covert operations to avoid direct governmental linkages and the associated diplomatic fallout.

The next few years are expected to be pivotal as Britain works to strengthen its resilience against such stealthy threats amidst a complex geopolitical environment and domestic political challenges. Beyond investing in advanced weaponry, officials acknowledge the need for enhanced intelligence coordination and proactive countermeasures to safeguard sovereignty and the security of vulnerable communities within the UK.