Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) have raised new concerns about the acceleration of biological weapon development, prompting calls for a strengthened U.S. biosecurity response similar in scale to the government's Operation Warp Speed initiative during the COVID-19 pandemic.

In recent research from Stanford University and the Arc Institute, AI was used to generate hundreds of novel virus genomes, some capable of infecting and killing bacteria more effectively than natural viruses. While these particular viruses cannot infect humans and were not intended as weapons, experts warn that the underlying technology could be adapted to create pathogens that pose serious threats. The possibility of AI enabling the rapid design of dangerous biological agents has heightened apprehension, especially given the involvement of opaque entities, as highlighted by recent concerns around Russia’s anti-plague research facilities.

To address these risks, biosecurity specialists and former defense officials gathered earlier this year in Washington to discuss solutions. They emphasized the need for a sustained, government-led program equipped with sufficient funding and infrastructure to develop medical countermeasures—such as vaccines, antibodies, antivirals, and diagnostics—at unprecedented speeds. Such a program would aim to replicate and institutionalize the rapid vaccine development and distribution capabilities demonstrated by Operation Warp Speed, a public-private partnership initiated in 2020 under the Trump administration to combat COVID-19.

Currently, legislation pending in the Senate seeks to limit misuse of synthetic DNA by requiring biotech firms to screen orders for gene sequences that could be exploited to create biological threats. Sponsored by Senators Tom Cotton (R-Arkansas) and Amy Klobuchar (D-Minnesota), the bill aims to prevent access to dangerous genetic material. However, experts caution that while the measure may reduce risks, it does not address the scenario in which prohibited sequences are nevertheless obtained and used illicitly, meaning the system could fail if even a single breach occurs.

The urgency to expedite the development of countermeasures is heightened by the nature of AI-designed pathogens, which may not follow traditional epidemiological patterns. Unlike naturally emerging viruses, which typically arise from animal reservoirs in specific locations, AI-generated threats might only become detectable once people begin to fall ill, narrowing the window for intervention. The Group of Seven (G7) has endorsed a goal of having vaccines ready within 100 days of identifying pandemic-capable pathogens, but this timeline may be insufficient for novel synthetic threats that could spread rapidly before detection.

Technological advances in AI offer hope for speeding countermeasure development. The same models that can quickly design potentially harmful viruses are also capable of rapidly generating antibodies and vaccines. Projections suggest that within a few years, the design of effective countermeasures could be reduced from months to hours. However, maintaining readiness outside of an immediate crisis presents challenges. Unlike the emergency-driven Operation Warp Speed, a permanent biosecurity initiative would require continuous investment in manufacturing capacity, technology platforms, and routine testing using hypothetical viral genomes to ensure rapid response capabilities.

Biosecurity experts stress that, unlike measures controlling nuclear threats—which include robust defense systems and stockpiles rather than solely relying on treaties—efforts to counter bioweapons must similarly adopt a layered and proactive approach. Given the uncertainties surrounding the ability to regulate AI and the entities developing these technologies, officials emphasize the importance of preparing for multiple potential outcomes to safeguard public health and national security.