John Culver, a former CIA analyst and recognized expert on the Chinese military, provided insights into the evolving capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the strategic challenges facing the United States in any potential conflict with China. Culver, who served as national intelligence officer for East Asia from 2015 to 2018 and is currently a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, shared his analysis ahead of a planned summit between President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping.

Since the 1980s, Culver says, China’s military has undergone a profound transformation. The PLA has moved from relying on outdated Korean and Vietnam War-era equipment to fielding advanced missiles, space, cyber, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare capabilities. He suggested that, apart from undersea warfare, the U.S. may no longer hold a clear edge in several key domains. Culver highlighted the sheer scale of China’s production capacity, noting that a single Chinese shipyard builds more vessels annually than all U.S. shipyards combined, with yearly deployments matching the size of the entire French navy. He also raised concerns about the impact of recent U.S. military engagements, such as the conflict in Iran, which reportedly depleted a significant portion of America’s long-range strike and theater missile defense resources, potentially leaving the U.S. ill-prepared for a confrontation with China.

Addressing the common U.S. military assertion that American forces maintain superiority in quality despite Chinese numerical advantages, Culver offered a nuanced view. He acknowledged the U.S. advantage in counterinsurgency, given extensive experience over the past two decades, but said in scenarios involving air and naval combat against a peer competitor, neither side holds a decisive advantage. Culver identified the hypothetical defense of Taiwan as the scenario where the U.S. feels most confident, emphasizing the naval aspect of sinking Chinese ships. However, he warned of more challenging "punitive campaigns" by China, which historically aim to inflict damage without direct territorial conquest, such as strikes against Taiwan’s military and industrial infrastructure. Such an approach threatens Taiwan’s critical semiconductor production, which accounts for over 90% of the world’s most advanced chips, with potentially severe global economic consequences.

Culver viewed Chinese confidence in defending their coastline as bolstered by extensive air defenses, especially along the stretch from Hainan Island to Beijing. He pointed out that while Iran’s long-range strike capabilities remain limited, the Iranians nonetheless reportedly managed to hit over 200 U.S. targets, suggesting vulnerabilities in U.S. forward-deployed air forces that China could exploit more effectively. Regarding U.S. aircraft carriers, Culver described them as vulnerable due to the range of Chinese anti-ship capabilities and the absence of "safe" operational zones near combat areas, complicating the carriers’ combat relevance.

The expert expressed skepticism about continued U.S. investment in aircraft carriers and traditional naval assets, suggesting that military culture and career incentives may underlie such spending decisions rather than strategic necessities. On the broader $1.5 trillion Trump administration defense budget proposal, Culver said increased funding might help but cautioned against relying solely on expensive systems without hardening forces against initial strikes and stockpiling munitions at unsustainable rates.

On strategies like turning the Taiwan Strait into a "Hellscape" through drone and missile attacks, Culver questioned the practicality, noting the challenges of deploying and protecting such assets from pre-emptive Chinese strikes. He compared potential blockades of Taiwan with existing dual blockades at the Strait of Hormuz, observing that China’s ability to disrupt shipping lanes and strike Taiwan’s ports could severely hinder trade and resupply, amplifying economic and military isolation.

Asked about the implications of U.S. involvement in Iran and how China views American resolve, Culver noted a mixed Chinese perception of the U.S. as a militarily aggressive but globally declining power with limited public tolerance for prolonged conflict. He suggested this dynamic might reinforce Beijing’s caution, as exemplified by Xi Jinping’s extensive purges of the PLA’s senior leadership, which Culver interpreted as an effort to ensure military loyalty and avoid internal unrest similar to that experienced in Tiananmen Square.

Culver also alluded to the impact of covert operations such as the raid in Venezuela, which might have impressed Chinese and Israeli observers for their precision and technological sophistication, reinforcing the strategic importance of cyber and intelligence capabilities.

Regarding China’s stance on the war in Iran, he said Beijing had not taken a hard position, viewing the conflict mainly as detrimental to stability but also noting benefits such as energy market disruptions favorable to Chinese interests. For now, he concluded, China’s primary challenges lie within its internal structures and governance rather than external conflicts, with Xi appearing cautious about rushing into military confrontation over Taiwan or elsewhere.