The persistence of Iran’s ruling regime this year has raised serious questions about what would be required to bring about its collapse, despite widespread protests and targeted efforts to undermine its leadership. The regime, anchored by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), remains determined to maintain power amid growing internal and external pressures.

Iran experienced significant unrest beginning in late 2025 with the eruption of protests initially sparked by a strike among Tehran’s Grand Bazaar shopkeepers. These demonstrations rapidly expanded, involving all 31 provinces and culminating in large-scale protests in the capital. A European diplomat estimated that over one million people took to the streets on January 8. The government’s response was severe, with confirmed deaths of at least 3,000 protesters and some estimates suggesting the toll could be as high as 30,000. Despite this crackdown, the protests did not succeed in toppling the regime.

The situation escalated in February when a U.S.-Israeli airstrike killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who had ruled Iran for more than three decades. Khamenei’s death followed a failed succession plan, as his son Mojtaba—later appointed to the leadership—was seriously wounded in the attack. For a brief period, power was held by a temporary leadership trio before authority passed to a younger, more hard-line faction. Rather than destabilizing the regime, the attack reinforced its continuity.

Experts identify five major factors necessary for any potential regime change in Iran. First, widespread public protests must resume on a large scale, encompassing a broad coalition across social and regional divisions. Economic hardship is seen as a likely catalyst, with inflation at its highest since World War II, youth unemployment exceeding 20 percent, fuel shortages, and rising prices creating significant strain. A harsh winter could further exacerbate these pressures.

Second, protesters must sustain their presence despite anticipated government crackdowns and internet blackouts. The regime’s ability to disrupt communications was evident during the earlier unrest, including efforts to jam Starlink satellite signals and crack down on internet infrastructure. The survival of organizational networks, especially those capable of functioning without internet access, will be critical.

Third, tools that enable coordination without reliance on digital networks need to be established. Previous attempts to circumvent the government blackout included U.S.-provided satellite connections, but these were largely neutralized by regime countermeasures.

The fourth condition involves a weakening or fracturing of Iran’s security forces. The IRGC and its affiliated paramilitary Basij have stayed loyal, driven by ideological commitments and economic interests. Historical and regional precedents show that successful revolutions often coincide with military hesitation or defections, conditions not yet observed within Iran’s forces.

Finally, the regime’s internal cohesion must falter, with mid-level officials seeing a viable future outside the existing power structure. Such defections are unlikely as long as the regime maintains control and isolation prevents external offers of alternative security or opportunity.

Without all five elements aligning—robust, sustained public protests; resilient communication networks; a destabilized security apparatus; and defections within the regime—the chances of overturning Iran’s leadership remain slim. Moreover, any transition is likely to be complex and unstable, potentially triggering leadership vacuums and increased activity from separatist groups such as the Kurds and Baluch.

Observers emphasize that effective support beyond rhetoric will require careful preparation by international actors, including detailed plans for immediate humanitarian aid, security stabilization, and reconstruction. Without such groundwork, promises of assistance may prove hollow, leaving the Iranian people facing a prolonged and uncertain struggle for change.