Israeli and U.S. military planning for a potential third conflict with Iran has taken shape amid ongoing tensions in the region. Recent reports indicate that the Israel Air Force has conducted training flights through Syrian and Iraqi airspace up to the Iranian border, practicing precision strikes on targets within Iran.

Since April 2024, Israel has employed its F-35 fighter jets to degrade Iranian radar systems on multiple occasions. These operations have been followed by extensive bombing raids using F-15 and F-16 jets, with over 200 Israeli aircraft participating in an initial wave of strikes in February 2025. The military strategy has involved a division of labor, with Israel focusing on western Iran and the Tehran area, while U.S. forces have targeted the southern region and some sites near Tehran. The primary objective is to secure air superiority, enabling drones—which can be more vulnerable but provide prolonged surveillance and strike capabilities—to play a significant role in the conflict.

The vulnerability of Iran’s nuclear facilities remains a central concern. U.S. President Donald Trump has emphasized the threat posed by the Pickaxe Mountain nuclear complex, which is not yet fully operational but is deeply buried underground. There is uncertainty about whether even the United States’ largest bunker-buster bombs, such as the 30,000-pound Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP), can destroy the facility. The U.S. previously employed these bombs against the Fordow plant, though Fordow’s location beneath a mountain led some Israeli military officials to doubt the long-term efficacy of such strikes. Defense analysts worry that Pickaxe Mountain’s greater depth may further reduce the effectiveness of airstrikes, potentially allowing Iran to develop nuclear weapons covertly.

A recent survey by the Institute for Science and International Security highlights key structural points at Pickaxe Mountain, including ventilation shafts and tunnel entrances, as potential targets to disrupt operations. However, the facility’s extensive underground network poses a significant challenge. This is just one of several strategic targets in a possible conflict.

Iran’s underground ballistic missile bases also present difficulties. During conflicts between June 2025 and early 2026, Israeli strikes caused cave-ins in these facilities, but Iranian crews quickly reopened the damaged sites. Iran has adapted its missile strategy by dispersing launch teams nationwide and conducting smaller, more frequent barrages. While these strikes have been less destructive than concentrated attacks, they have frequently disrupted Israeli daily life. Additionally, Iran has targeted U.S. military bases in the region, causing billions in damage.

Questions remain about Israel’s ability to neutralize these dispersed missile threats and whether the operation would be brief or prolonged. Trump has advocated for a swift, three-day campaign, but Iranian officials have threatened retaliatory attacks on U.S. naval vessels, underwater communication infrastructure, and critical energy installations belonging to U.S. allies. Saudi Arabia, for instance, has already endured lethal attacks from Yemeni Houthis.

Some Israeli officials, including former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, argue that only a ground offensive could effectively eliminate Iran’s deeply buried uranium enrichment assets. Others debate whether striking Iran’s energy infrastructure might hasten regime change or alternatively rally domestic support for the Iranian government against foreign aggression.

The prospects for a rapid resolution are uncertain. A prolonged conflict may weaken Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities but may not compel a fundamental shift in Tehran’s posture or lead to regime change. How the Israeli public and leadership will respond to renewed missile barrages and the geopolitical fallout remains to be seen. The potential third U.S.-Israeli confrontation with Iran promises to delay Iranian military threats but may leave many strategic questions unresolved.