Concerns about the stability of Europe’s political centre have intensified in recent months amid notable advances by far-right and far-left parties in key European countries. Yet, despite this turbulence, analysts argue that the continent’s centrist political forces are likely to endure, bolstered by structural and institutional factors unique to the European political landscape.
In Germany, Europe’s largest economy, the rise of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) has unsettled observers, especially after the party topped the polls in two state elections this year. Simultaneously, the far-left Die Linke secured a victory in the Berlin state election. Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s approval ratings have dropped sharply to 13 percent, prompting speculation about his political future. The situation has fueled worries over the possible erosion of Germany’s democratic centre at a critical moment.
Similarly, in France—Europe’s second-largest economy—Marine Le Pen, leader of the far-right Rassemblement National, leads the polls ahead of the presidential election scheduled for next year. Her growing popularity has sparked debate over the potential impact of a far-right presidency on French and European politics.
However, experts highlight three main factors that reinforce the resilience of Europe’s political centre. First, the widespread use of proportional representation across many European countries limits the likelihood of any single far-right party gaining unchecked power. Second, far-right parties that have joined governing coalitions often moderate their policies or face significant political setbacks. Third, European Union membership imposes substantial constraints on populist parties’ ability to implement radical anti-establishment agendas.
Examples from the Netherlands and Austria illustrate these dynamics. The Party for Freedom (PVV), led by Geert Wilders, briefly led a coalition government following the 2023 elections but eventually exited the coalition amid EU and political constraints, leading to a sharp decline in support. Austria’s Freedom Party, despite winning the most votes in 2024, has failed to secure a governing coalition and remains in opposition. Both cases underscore how proportional representation and coalition politics constrain far-right influence.
In Germany, centrist parties maintain a “firewall” policy barring alliances with the AfD, which currently polls near 30 percent nationally. Although such a level of support could complicate government formation, the far-right party is still expected to be excluded from power.
France’s political system differs, with its two-round presidential election offering a winner-takes-all outcome. Should Le Pen prevail, she would assume the presidency. Yet parallels with Italy’s current government led by Giorgia Meloni show that far-right origins do not necessarily translate into extremist governance. Meloni has largely pursued a centre-right agenda and maintained cooperative relations with the EU, despite criticisms over tougher immigration policies. Such moderation reflects practical constraints, including economic imperatives tied to EU membership and market stability.
Le Pen herself has been rebranding her party, distancing it from earlier hardline stances and abandoning plans to exit the eurozone. While some of her promises—such as ending French aid to Ukraine and prioritizing national preference in jobs—clash with EU rules, political and economic realities are likely to temper her approach if elected.
The fears that far-right victories herald a return to the authoritarianism of the 1930s overlook the contemporary European context, where far-right parties have both entered and left government through peaceful, democratic processes. Even Hungary’s Viktor Orbán accepted electoral defeat earlier this year.
Although the rise of parties like the AfD and Rassemblement National heightens political tension and presents challenges to centrist governance, it does not fundamentally threaten the survival of European democracy. The continent’s electoral systems, coalition traditions, and the binding framework of the EU continue to serve as robust safeguards for democratic stability.
