The ongoing conflict in Yemen involving the Houthi movement has spanned more than 15 years, prompting some observers to suggest negotiating with the Houthis as the de facto authorities in Sanaa rather than continuing armed confrontation. Historically, various ruling factions in the capital have been engaged with, regardless of ideology or identity, making this approach seem pragmatic to some. However, the nature of the Houthi project presents significant challenges to such a strategy.

The Houthis are widely seen as fundamentally opposed to the concept of a conventional state. While they seek to harness state resources, institutions, and international recognition, they simultaneously maintain an independent armed force and conduct military campaigns aligned with their external alliances. Their objective appears less about assuming control of a traditional state apparatus and more about advancing their organizational project through the exercise of power.

This dynamic was evident during Yemen’s National Dialogue Conference between 2013 and 2015. The Houthis participated under the Peace and National Partnership Agreement, which granted them political representation and regional privileges, contingent on surrendering medium and heavy weapons to state control. Instead, the group seized state institutions, detained then-President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, dissolved parliament, and systematically excluded other factions from power. These actions intensified internal conflict and led to widespread violence.

Following their rise, the Houthis sought to merge state power with their movement but ended up establishing a parallel system of supervisors who exercised real authority alongside official government structures. An attempted partnership with former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who still commanded significant military forces despite being out of office, ended violently in 2017 when Saleh was killed after misjudging the Houthis’ ambitions.

Some argue that the Houthi takeover is simply the outcome of a power struggle that should be accepted as a new political reality to facilitate dialogue and peace efforts. Yet, past efforts to engage with the Houthis as legitimate state actors have been met with limited success, due in large part to the group’s refusal to transform its identity from an armed faction into a conventional governing authority.

The Houthis’ approach has been compared to other non-state armed movements such as Daesh and Hezbollah, though their ideologies differ. Daesh outright rejected existing borders and sought to establish a caliphate, while Hezbollah participates in Lebanon’s political system but maintains an autonomous armed wing and external affiliations. The Houthis similarly blend political participation with armed autonomy and a focus on preserving their organizational control.

Ultimately, while the protracted conflict has prompted calls for pragmatism in dealing with the Houthis, their structural rejection of the traditional state model complicates the prospect of negotiations aimed at integrating them into Yemen’s formal governance framework.