The unexpected release of former Iranian Prime Minister Hossein Mousavi from nearly two decades of house arrest has sparked debate over the future direction of Iran’s fractured political landscape amid efforts toward a fragile peace. Mousavi, who served as Iran’s last prime minister in the 1980s and later led the country’s reformist movement in the early 2000s, had been confined to his home for 17 years and was recently freed to receive hospital treatment.

Observers suggest that this sudden change may indicate Tehran is exploring internal reconciliation or preparing for a possible reordering of power as the country faces mounting pressures. However, opinions differ on whether the reformist movement led by Mousavi still holds significant influence.

Amir Mosadegh Katouzian, former editor of Radio Free Europe’s Iran desk, contends that reformists are unlikely to regain prominence in the near term. He projected it could take decades before genuine political parties emerge and reformists have an opportunity to assert influence, noting that the current scene is dominated by pragmatic conservatives such as Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.

Political analyst Nasser Karami offers a different perspective, suggesting the survival of the Islamic Republic may depend on some form of intra-regime transition reminiscent of Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms in the Soviet Union. According to Karami, while Mousavi’s role in reformism has evolved into a broader critique of the regime’s legitimacy—including calls for a referendum, a new constitution, and a constituent assembly—he is no longer viewed as a renewal figure. Karami emphasized that reformism has lost its momentum as a meaningful force, with its leading figures aging and less able to galvanize public support.

Karami also pointed out that Ghalibaf’s control over the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and affiliated security organizations consolidates conservative power, diminishing the reformists’ chances. He argued the regime’s power now lies in two main camps: the IRGC and segments of the public, with some influence attributed to Reza Pahlavi, a prominent opposition figure.

Three potential scenarios appear to be unfolding within Tehran’s political calculus. The first involves an arrangement in which Ghalibaf retains real power while Ali Motahari Pezeshkian, a moderate figure with reformist leanings, serves as the official civilian face of government, projecting a more moderate image abroad while maintaining hardline control behind the scenes. The second scenario posits a managed national reconciliation involving Ghalibaf, Pezeshkian, and reformist leaders like Mousavi in a new political configuration. Here, Ghalibaf would secure regime stability, Pezeshkian would represent the government publicly, and Mousavi or his allies might play a symbolic role in easing social tensions.

Supporting this idea, reformist politician Javad Emam has noted that the Supreme National Security Council and heads of Iran’s three government branches are reviewing Mousavi’s house arrest, indicating a wider strategic consideration. Nevertheless, threats directed at Pezeshkian suggest significant resistance from hardliners opposed even to a moderate civilian presence.

The third scenario is one of exclusion and confrontation, where hardline factions within security and intelligence agencies reject both reformists and Ghalibaf if he pursues accommodation. In this case, Pezeshkian could be marginalized, Mousavi could be returned to house arrest, and Ghalibaf might increasingly rely on repression and security forces to maintain order. Recent incidents, including pro-Guard demonstrations denouncing Ghalibaf and other officials, point to fractures within the hardline camp itself, with some questioning Ghalibaf’s commitment to revolutionary ideals.

Iran today bears little resemblance to the nation of the late 1990s or the 2009 presidential election period, when reformism was at its height. The cumulative impact of prolonged unrest—including the recent Woman, Life, Freedom uprising and the January 2026 massacre—has shifted public sentiment well beyond calls for reform from within the existing system. How the Islamic Republic navigates these pressures and whether Iranian society will accept the outcome remain central uncertainties for the country’s political future.