Chinese President Xi Jinping is set to visit Egypt this week, marking his first trip to the country since January 2016, as Beijing seeks to strengthen its economic, military, and diplomatic ties with Cairo. The visit follows the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Kyrgyzstan and coincides with the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and Egypt.

China’s foreign ministry recently described the bilateral relationship as “at their best in history” and indicated that Xi’s visit aims to build on previous cooperation and chart the course for future collaboration. Xi’s last visit saw the signing of agreements spanning infrastructure, energy, finance, and industrial development. Meanwhile, Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi has visited China eight times since assuming office in 2014, with his most recent trip in May 2024.

Observers view Xi’s visit as politically significant for both countries. John Calabrese, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute, noted that the visit allows China to highlight a strong partnership with a key Arab and African player outside Western influence. For Egypt, the visit serves to demonstrate that its foreign policy remains independent of Western powers, particularly the United States.

Economic ties between the two nations have grown substantially, with bilateral trade reaching approximately $20.8 billion in 2025, up from $17.38 billion the previous year, according to Egyptian Commercial Service data. Investment from China, especially in industrial sectors near the Suez Canal, has expanded as well. The China-Egypt TEDA Suez Economic and Trade Cooperation Zone in Ain Sokhna is home to nearly 200 firms, with investment exceeding $3.8 billion and around 10,000 jobs created by the end of 2025. Among these enterprises, China Jushi operates a major fiberglass production facility serving export markets in Europe, the Middle East, and beyond.

Calabrese emphasized that the relationship is shifting beyond trade to focus more on industrial investment, with Egypt positioning itself as a manufacturing hub for Chinese firms targeting European and African markets. There is potential for further growth through integrating Egyptian companies into Chinese-led supply chains that serve various regional markets.

Military cooperation between Egypt and China is also deepening. On August 22, they commenced their second joint air exercise, Eagles of Civilisation, during which China deployed J-16 fighter jets to Egypt, supported by mid-air refueling from a YY-20A tanker. This exercise demonstrated China’s capacity to conduct air operations far from its territory. Egyptian officials have indicated that expanding military engagement with China reflects an effort to diversify their defense partnerships beyond longstanding reliance on U.S. military aid.

On regional security issues, both China and Egypt broadly support a ceasefire in the Gaza conflict, Palestinian statehood, and Egypt’s mediating and reconstruction roles. Regarding Iran, their positions display partial alignment; both favor de-escalation and seek to prevent broader conflict that could disrupt vital shipping routes through the Suez Canal and Red Sea. However, China’s closer ties with Iran and resistance to U.S. pressure suggest that its coordination with Egypt on Iran-related matters will likely be limited to calls for restraint.

While China played a mediation role last year to restore diplomatic ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran, experts suggest Beijing has been more cautious about direct involvement in ongoing conflicts in the Middle East.